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The European Monetary Institute have narrowed down the choice of candidate 
strategies for a single monetary policy within European Monetary Union to inflation 
targets or monetary aggregate targets.  In practice it is unlikely to be a simple choice 
between these targets, since all monetary authorities that currently pursue either of 
these strategies also monitor a wide set of economic and financial variables to inform 
monetary policy.  The choice of target will indicate more about the style of monetary 
policymaking.  This paper focuses on inflation targets which have come to prominence 
internationally over the last decade.  It examines both the theoretical and operational 
issues arising from the use of inflation targets as part of monetary policy.  The 
theoretical aspects of inflation targeting are developed in a model which uses inflation 
forecasts explicitly as an intermediate target.  These inflation targets provide a guide to 
policymakers by increasing the ability to establish credibility and commitment to 
overcome the problem of inflation bias inherent with discretionary monetary policy.  
The operational aspects of inflation targets stress the role of (i) deciding on the 
ultimate objective, either price stability solely or in addition to an output goal, (ii) the 
independence of the monetary authority from political interference, (iii) setting the 
inflation target value, either for inflation or the price level, (iv) choosing the 
appropriate time horizon, (v) the choice of instruments to achieve the target and so on.  
The experiences of those countries that have adopted inflation targets is drawn upon.  
While this experience has tended to be quite positive, the timespan since their adoption 
is too short for a conclusive assessment.  The decision on whether inflation targeting 
will eclipse monetary aggregates as the dominant monetary policy strategy will depend 
on the accuracy of inflation forecasting compared with the predictability of money 
demand.    
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1.  Introduction  
 
The objective of this paper is to consider the use of inflation targeting as part of 
monetary policymaking.  Inflation targets have come to prominence in recent years as a 
primary tool for the conduct of monetary policy as reflected in their adoption in 
countries like Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.  Our motivation for this paper is the consideration of direct inflation 
targeting as a candidate strategy in conducting a single monetary policy in Stage Three 
of European Monetary Union (EMI, 1997a). 
 
Inflation targeting can be considered to be a new style of monetary management 
competing with more traditional styles of monetary aggregate targeting and exchange 
rate pegging (Padoa-Schioppa, 1996).  The European Monetary Institute (EMI) has 
considered five possible strategies in the pursuit of the objective of price stability 
within EMU.  These included interest rate pegging, nominal income targeting, 
exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting and direct inflation targeting (EMI, 
1997b).  This list of candidate strategies has now been narrowed down to two: 
monetary targeting and direct inflation targeting.  The reasoning behind the relegation 
of the first three strategies lies in the difficulty of identifying an equilibrium real interest 
rate consistent with price stability; the size of the new euro area and the extent of intra 
currency-area trade which will make exchange rate pegging less effective; while 
nominal income targeting would be difficult to control by the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) and could be misinterpreted as its ultimate goal, whereas the 
primary objective is the maintenance of  price stability. 
 
The emphasis on monetary aggregate targeting and direct inflation targets has to be 
seen in the context of current monetary policy conduct within the EU.  The larger 
member countries of the EMS, in particular Germany, have in the past used monetary 
targeting as the centrepiece of their monetary policy framework.  In contrast the 
smaller member countries, including Ireland, have substituted exchange rate targets for 
independent monetary targets.  The pace of financial innovation and increased concern 
for exchange rate stability in the 1980s led to a diminution of monetary aggregate   2
targets in most countries, with the notable exception of Germany
1.  However, 
monetary aggregates continue to be important policy guides in all countries.  In some 
EU countries a shift over to explicit inflation targets has occurred within the last five 
years in an attempt to provide a fix for inflation expectations.  The experience with 
inflation targeting so far has tended to be positive but the timespan since their 
incorporation is too short for a conclusive assessment.  Indeed a number of countries, 
like the United States and Japan, have established credible, low inflation policies 
without the use of explicit inflation targets over the same time-period.  So with 
variants of both types of monetary policy strategies in use within the EU area, the EMI 
has chosen to recommend both monetary targeting and direct inflation targeting as 
options for the ESCB to consider.  The decision on the monetary policy strategy in 
Stage Three will be taken by the ESCB “on the basis of the economic environment and 
the financial structure prevailing in the euro area” (EMI, 1997a). 
 
Given that exchange rate targeting is no longer on the ESCB agenda, the issue facing 
the Bank is which of the two strategies under consideration would best serve the 
objective of price stability in the Irish economy?  The purpose of our paper is to inform 
on one side of this question by focusing on the issues raised by direct inflation 
targeting.  Clearly it will not be just a simple choice between either monetary or 
inflation targeting, given that all the central banks that currently pursue either of these 
two strategies monitor a wide set of economic and financial variables as indicators the 
stance of monetary policy.  However, the choice is about the style of monetary 
policymaking in terms of which strategy is predominant.
2 
 
In the next section we set out a framework to examine the case for inflation targets as 
a mechanism in overcoming the problem of inflation bias arising from time 
inconsistency of policy choice.  The relationship between targets, rules and instruments 
is also considered.  In Section 3 we present a theoretical model of direct inflation 
targeting, based on the work of Svensson (1997a), which uses inflation forecasts as an 
                                                 
1 While the German Bundesbank have monetary targeting as its stated policy strategy Bernanke and 
Mihov (1997) conclude that their actions are better described as inflation targeting rather than 
monetary targeting. 
2 An excellent taxonomic and descriptive account of the strategy issues facing the ESCB is contained 
in Goodhart and Vinals (1994).   3
intermediate target.  The literature on inflation targeting has tended to highlight that 
monetary growth and exchange rate targets generally produce higher inflation 
variability than inflation targeting.  As a consequence inflation targets might be 
considered more desirable for a central bank whose objective is price stability.  In 
Section 4 the issues involved in operationalising an inflation target are discussed 
referring to recent international experience.  The final section concludes with some 
observations on the applicability and desirability of an inflation target framework. 
 
2.  Monetary Policy Framework  
Before proceeding to examine inflation targets in more detail, it is useful to consider 
the reasons why these targets are considered necessary.  Among the few core 
propositions widely accepted in macroeconomics is that monetary policy is neutral in 
the long run and that persistent inflation is always a monetary phenomenon
3.  As 
Eichenbaum (1997) points out the consequence of these propositions is that the 
“primary objective of monetary policy should be long-run price stability or at least a 
low average rate of inflation”.  However, two other widely believed propositions are 
that monetary policy is not neutral in the short run and most shocks to output are not 
due to monetary policy shocks.  These latter two propositions suggest that it might 
then be welfare-enhancing to be activist in the use of monetary policy to help the 
economy adjust to non-policy shocks.  Hence, a fundamental tension in the conduct of 
monetary policy can arise in terms of whether it is better to have a short-run activist or 
a long-run neutral policy stance. 
 
The Problem of Inflation Bias 
 
It is this fundamental tension that led to the seminal contributions of Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) which demonstrated that policymakers 
are unable to commit themselves to a low inflation policy, despite the absence of a 
long-run trade-off, and this results in excessive inflation.  This problem of inflation 
bias stems from the lack of credibility on the part of policymakers.  The premise is that   4
if expected inflation is low then the marginal costs of additional inflation are low, 
whereas the marginal benefit of pursuing expansionary policy, by pushing output 
temporarily above its normal market clearing level, is high (Romer, 1996).  This 
provides an incentive to the policymaker to cheat by allowing inflation to rise above 
expectations and so raising output by surprising agents in the economy.  However, if 
agents realise that policymakers have this incentive they will rationally expect a higher 
rate of inflation, so the low inflation strategy is not credible.  The result is higher 
inflation with no benefits in terms of higher output. 
 
The problem of inflation bias is that the low inflation monetary policy is time 
inconsistent.  The problems from time or dynamic inconsistency arises from the 
inability of policy-makers to precommit.  Economic agents do not trust policymakers 
to pursue the low inflation policy knowing they have the discretion to alter the growth 
of money to engineer a surprise inflation.  The solution to the time inconsistency 
problem of inflation bias is to ensure commitment to the stated policy.  The time 
inconsistency problem is part of the more general debate about rules versus discretion.  
The advocates of rules argue that these are needed to restore credibility by reducing 
the discretionary powers of policy makers that give rise to the time inconsistency 
problems.  These rules can be fixed rules, which remain the same in all circumstances, 




The time inconsistency problem can only be overcome by rules if these are in fact 
binding.  It is not enough just to state that monetary policy will be determined by a rule 
if the public know that the policymaker has the discretion to circumvent that rule.  
Indeed this is the crucial point, it is not the discretion per se that is the problem, it is 
                                                                                                                                       
3 An excellent set of articles on the topic of  “Is There A Core Of Practical Macroeconomics That We 
Should All Believe” is contained in the American Economic Review, May 1997. 
4 The k% monetary growth rule proposed by Friedman (1969) is an example of a fixed rule. Two 
examples of feedback rules which have recently attracted international focus are the  McCallum 
(1988) rule and the Taylor (1993) rule. Both of these simple rules offer a guide to the Central Bank’s 
discretion in the formulation of monetary policy by adjusting a policy instrument in response to 
deviations in target objectives. In the case of the McCallum rule the focus is on the nominal growth in 
the monetary base consistent with a nominal income target, whereas in the Taylor rule the focus is on 
the nominal interest rate consistent with an inflation target and output target. See Stuart (1996) for an 
application of these rules.   5
the agents’ knowledge that the policymaker has discretion and their belief that the 
policy-maker has the incentive to use it to engineer surprise inflations.  A number of 
solutions have been proposed to address the problem of inflation bias.  Three 
microeconomic approaches that have received considerable attention in the economic 
literature are reputation, delegation and incentive contracts.   
 
Policymakers try to establish a reputation by overcoming agents’ uncertainty about 
their actions in order to lower their inflation expectations (Barro, 1986).  Delegation 
involves the government appointing a central banker that is more adverse than the 
general public to inflation, described by Rogoff (1985) as the “conservative banker” 
approach.  Another approach proposes structures to ensure that the central banker is 
rewarded or punished for meeting or exceeding the socially preferred rate of inflation, 
this is the “optimal contract” approach proposed by Walsh (1995).  It is important to 
note that these approaches are not mutually exclusive in that they share common 
elements and can be used in conjunction with each other. 
 
Targets and Instruments 
 
Central to all monetary policy strategies is the targets and instruments framework 
associated with the Tinbergen-Theil tradition.  In this framework the policymaker 
controls certain instruments to meet an ultimate target or objective.  This objective is 
normally considered to be the optimisation of a social welfare function, which in the 
literature on this topic is normally cast as the minimisation of a social loss function of 
deviations in output and inflation from target values.  Based on the social welfare 
function that is being optimised the policymaker must specify policy or intermediate 
targets.  The policymaker then has to identify the policy instruments and establish the 
instrument rules to attain these targets.  This framework is a dynamic programming or 
optimal control type problem whereby policy actions that affect the economy do so 
with considerable lags and uncertainties.  Given these lags and the uncertainties about 
the impact of policy on targets it is necessary to use policy indicators.  Intermediate 
targets and indicators fall between instruments and objectives.   
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There are several reasons why policy rules may be useful (Taylor, 1996).   Firstly, if 
agents are rational and forward looking then it is necessary to specify future as well as 
current policy actions, so reducing uncertainty and thereby reducing risk premia in 
markets.  Secondly, policy rules provide a focal point for policymakers to inform their 
actions on achieving their goals.  Thirdly, they are a way to increase the accountability 
of policymakers.  Fourthly, they are an easy way to communicate with market 
participants and to educate the community at large.  Finally, and most importantly in 
the academic debate, policy rules are a means of addressing the time inconsistency 
issue. 
 
This type of framework requires that policymakers clearly specify the goals of policy, 
the instruments at their disposal, their model of the macroeconomy and their forecasts 
of exogenous variables (Blinder, 1997).  These goals can either be limited to price 
stability alone or can in addition include an output/employment stabilisation objective.  
The attainment of these goals requires a set of efficient target rules for monetary policy 
that minimises a weighted sum of output variances and inflation variances.  
Comparison of the different monetary policy strategies discussed in the academic 
literature is generally based on a trade-off between price (inflation) and output stability.  
While there is a broad agreement on the goals in this literature, differences emerge in 
the underlying macroeconomy models, the instruments advocated, the role of 
expectations and the type of lag structures which make direct comparison difficult.  We 
do not attempt to undertake such a comparison in this paper. 
 
Price Level or Inflation Targets 
 
A related issue in this framework is whether it is better to have a price level target 
rather than an inflation target, given that most central banks interpret price stability as 
their primary objective.  The literal meaning of price stability is the stability of the 
average price level, not low inflation (Fischer, 1996).  Also it important to note that a 
price level target is not the same as a zero inflation target.  If shocks push the inflation 
above the average inflation level, with a price level target the policymaker responds by   7
deflating the economy to below average levels in order to return to the original path.  
In contrast, even where zero inflation is the target, inflation targeting ignores past 
failures and tries to continue on the new higher price path.  As Figure 1 below 
demonstrates, the base price level ratchets upwards under inflation targeting.
5 
Source: Fischer (1996) 
 
There may indeed be a strong case for moving to a target for the price level but most 
central banks have opted for the more limited objective of a target of low inflation 
(Kenny and McGettigan, 1997).  Price level targets can provide greater certainty about 
prices in the future because the policymaker attempts to follow a price level path.  The 
conventional wisdom is that price level targeting gives rise to low price level 
uncertainty but higher inflation and output uncertainty than with inflation targets.  The 
reasoning is that in order to stabilise the price level, higher than average inflation is 
followed by lower than average inflation, which may mean deflation, so leading to 
inflation variability.  This higher inflation variability then results in  higher output 
variability as a result of nominal rigidities.  However, contrary to conventional wisdom 
Svensson (1996a) argues that price level targets may be better for society than inflation 
targets by delivering lower inflation variability than inflation targets if there is 
persistence in unemployment/output.  Other authors have argued for price level 
                                                 
5 Inflation targeting allows base drift in the price level such that the price level becomes non-trend 
stationary. This implies that the variance of future price levels increase without bounds over the 
forecasted period. This is far from a literal interpretation of price stability (Svensson, 1996b). 
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targeting as an alternative to exchange rate targets in reducing output variability 
(Rodseth, 1996).
6  While there exists considerable support for price level targets, they 
are not currently on the agenda of most central banks.  This is in part a consequence of 
the true rate of inflation being below the measured rate in all countries, see Boskin et 
al.  (1997).   
 
Inflation Targets in the Transition to EMU 
 
Inflation targeting has received some attention in the transition to Stage Three.  
Canzoneri et al.  (1997) compared the use of inflation targets within the current EU 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in a theoretical framework.  This study addressed the 
credibility-stabilisation trade-off using two mechanisms.  The first mechanism 
considered is inflation targeting, with Walsh-type inflation penalties, in a modified 
Barro-Gordon model.  This model is modified to include an interest rate bias in 
addition to the inflation bias that stems from political pressure to keep interest rates 
low.  The second mechanism is exchange rate pegging proposed by Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1988) for a country to fix their exchange rate to a low inflation currency in 
order to import credibility, like under the current ERM.   
 
These mechanisms were compared on the efficiency of achieving the credibility-
stabilisation trade-off.  The Canzoneri et al.  results were rather heuristic in nature but 
suggested that inflation targeting is more efficient at reducing the inflation bias than the 
ERM when political pressure is not distorting the stabilisation effort and when the 
shocks are primarily regional in nature.  However, the ERM performs better in terms 
of credibility when the delay between action and punishment under inflation targeting is 
taken into account.  The downside of the rapid responsiveness of the ERM to shocks, 
through asset price adjustments, is that it is then prone to self-fulfilling speculative 
attacks.  This has led De Grauwe (1996) to explore the possibility of using inflation 
targets to achieve inflation convergence in the transition towards EMU.  The results of 
this paper were in line with the idea of inflation targets being more sustainable than 
                                                 
6 Rodseth’s paper uses the Poole (1970) methodology to demonstrate the conditions favourable to price 
level targets. These conditions are high volatility and low price elasticity of aggregate demand, low   9
exchange rate pegging but suffering from a similar credibility problem.  The solution 
proposed recommends combining inflation targets with Rogoff-type proposals on 
appointing an independent, conservative central banker. 
 
3.  A Model for Inflation Targeting 
 
In an inflation targeting framework expected, or forecasted, inflation is compared 
against an announced target in order to guide policy decisions.  In this way the inflation 
forecast operates as an intermediate target.  An examination of the inflation targeting 
literature indicates there is a distinction between a narrow and broad definition of 
inflation targeting.  In the narrow definition, policymakers try to hit a fixed inflation 
target as closely as possible, reacting to shocks as soon as they occur.  The broad 
definition allows for gradual adjustment to the inflation target in response to shocks so 
as to reduce output variability (Ball, 1997).  We will consider both the single goal and 
joint goal cases in the context of the model presented below. 
 
“Direct inflation targeting” in its pure theoretical form has no explicit intermediate 
target.  Actual inflation is the target, and although the conditional forecast is used as a 
guide to policy it is not an explicit target. As Green (1996) points out this strategy is 
prone to inflation bias because there is a credibility problem.  The bias becomes 
apparent not as inflation above the desired level but as a wedge between the announced 
target and the observed inflation.  This inconsistency can lead to non-credibility 
resulting in the target being overshot on average
7.  This problem can be addressed by 
either assigning price stability as the sole policy goal or a joint goal for inflation and 
output provided these are consistent. 
 
To examine the theoretical underpinnings of inflation targets we outline a model of 
inflation targets by Svensson (1997a).  An explicit intermediate target is considered to 
                                                                                                                                       
volatility and high  price elasticity of aggregate supply and a high volatility of the foreign price level. 
7 However, this problem may be overstated since monetary policy is a continuous process whereby 
reputations can be built up over time.  Green (1996) notes that agents can understand and accept this 
inconsistency, as evidenced in the context of Germany where the Bundesbank has retained credibility 
yet missed the monetary target in 9 out of 21 years.   10
be the best way to maintain price stability, that is low and stable inflation.  A serious 
difficulty in targeting inflation directly is the imperfect control of inflation that all 
central banks experience.  These imperfections arise from uncertainties about agents’ 
expectations, the underlying models of the economy and the lags between actions and 
outcomes.
8 The solution proposed by Svensson is to use inflation forecasts as an 
explicit intermediate target.  The model is set up as an optimal control problem with 
inflation forecasts as the control variable and the interest rate as the control instrument.   
 
The policymaker is assumed to minimise a conventional quadratic social loss function 
which depends on deviations of p from p* and y from y* 
 
    L Y Y t t t = - + - ( *) ( *) p p l
2 2  
or 
    L y t t t = - + ( *) ( ) p p l
2 2 
 
where pt is inflation between period t-1 and period t, p* is the long run inflation target, 
Yt is output in period t, Y* is potential output and yt is the output gap.  The l ‡ 0 term 
is the weight on output stabilisation around the natural output level
9 relative to 
inflation stabilisation around the long run inflation target.  l = 0 implies a single goal of 
inflation stabilisation while l > 0 attaches importance to output stabilisation in a joint 
objective for monetary policy.   
 
The model needs to capture the stylised facts that both inflation and aggregate demand 
react with long and variable lags to changes in the policymaker’s control instrument.
10  
The interest rate (it) is the control instrument in this model.  The lag for inflation is 
longer than that for aggregate demand (Romer, 1996) and these stylised facts are 
captured in the two equations below.  The model is set out in detail in the Appendix to 
                                                 
8 See Blinder (1997) for an interesting analogy, using an example of a hotel thermostat, on the impact 
of lags for monetary policy. 
9 The natural output level is the level consistent with constant inflation. In the long run there is no 
long-run output target separate from the natural output level. For algebraic convenience this natural 
rate is normalised to zero in the model. 
10 For expositional purposes the lags in the model presented are deterministic rather than variable.   11
this paper.  The first equation is the so-called accelerationist Phillips curve where the 
change in inflation depends on output lagged one period. 
 
(1)      pt+1 = pt + ayt + et+1 
 
where a is a positive constant and et is a serially uncorrelated negative supply shock 
with zero mean.
11  The second equation of the model is the IS aggregate demand 
relationship where output depends on previous output and the real rate of interest. 
 
(2)      yt+1 = b1yt - b2(it - pt) + ht 
 
where the bs are positive constants and ht is a serially uncorrelated demand shock with 
zero mean.  The current inflation rate is used as a proxy for expected inflation to derive 
the real interest rate.  Any change in the current interest rate will only affect output 
with a one period lag and inflation with a two period lag.  However, because of the 
uncertainties due to demand and supply shocks the control of inflation and output will 
be imperfect.  Consequently, the forecasts of inflation will be uncertain (Cecchetti, 
1995).  Taking expectations of the two period inflation forecast
12 
 
(3)    pt+2|t = pt+1 + ayt+1 = pt + ayt + a(b1yt - b2(it - pt)) 
 
    pt+2|t = pt + a(1+b1)yt -  ab2(it - pt))
13 
 
However, actual inflation in period two will differ from forecasted by the demand and 
supply shocks that occur in periods one and two. 
 
(4)    pt+2 = p t+2|t + (et+1 + et+2 + aht+1) 
 
The policymaker has to choose the inflation target so as to offset the inflation bias 
problem inherent with all discretionary monetary policy frameworks.  As noted, the 
                                                 
11 If the lags are variable then the a term will be time varying. This Phillips curve case is the most 
famous application of the Lucas critique. Lucas (1976) observes that  a is high in low inflation 
environments and low in high inflation environments. 
12 In Svensson’s notation the expectation term Et(pt+2) is denoted as  pt+2|t. This emphasises that 
expected inflation is conditional on unchanged policies. 
13 et+i|t and ht+i|t = 0 by assumption.   12
control instrument is the interest rate and the objective function is the minimisation of 
the expected discounted sum of future loss functions, where d is the social planner’s 
discount rate reflecting the social rate of time preference. 
 
The optimal control model is explained in the Appendix where it is shown that the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the case of the single inflation goal (l = 0) is  
 
(5)        p t+2|t = p* 
 
that is the policymakers should take the two-period inflation forecast as an 
intermediate target for optimal monetary policy.  The interest rate should then be 
adjusted to make this forecast equal to the inflation target. 
 
The case of  joint output and inflation stabilisation goals is more complicated (l > 0) 
 
(6)      p t+2|t = Cp* + (1-C) p t+1|t  













































The coefficient C is the rate of adjustment towards the long run target, the higher its 
value the faster the two period forecast adjusts to the target.  It is a weighted average 
of the long run inflation target and the predetermined one-period inflation forecast.  
The higher the weight on output stabilisation the slower the adjustment to the long run 
inflation target.   
 
We can see from this multiple goal case that optimal policy involves a gradual lean 
towards the inflation target as opposed to opportunistic disinflation (Blinder, 1997).
14  
                                                 
14 Some economists would argue that disinflation should be done swiftly with a “short, sharp shock”.  
These include Ball (1994) and Yates and Chapple (1996) who argue that the sacrifice ratio, in terms 
of lost output, is smaller if a disinflation is carried out quickly.   13
This model can incorporate solutions to overcome the problems with inflation targeting 
raised by Green (1996).  The  Svensson rule uses the inflation forecast as an 
intermediate target.  It is either always at the long-run inflation target, in the case of a 
single goal, or gradually approaching it, in the case of joint goals.  The inflation 
forecast can be considered a good intermediate target in pursuing these goals.   
 
The Svensson model highlights the distinction between target rules and instrument 
rules.  Setting the interest rate to keep the inflation forecast equal to the inflation 
target gives rise to an optimal reaction function that is endogenously determined.  The 
target rule is a function of the available relevant information.  In contrast instrument 
rules, like the Taylor and McCallum rules, specify the reaction function in terms of 
current information.  In the context of the model the instrument rule depends on 
inflation and output where 
 
    it = p t + h(p t - p*) + gyt 



































This instrument rule, which is a variant of the Taylor rule, is more complicated than the 
target rules set  out above since it depends on all the parameters of the model as 
contained in the h and g terms.
15  The target rule is simpler than the instrument rule in 
that it depends only on the Phillips curve and the loss function.  The target rule also 
has the virtue that it is more stable, allows more flexibility, is easier to identify and 
requires less confidence in the structural macroeconomy model. 
 
As Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) in their recent article suggest, inflation targeting 
should be “construed as a framework for making monetary policy, rather than as a 
rigid rule”.  We now turn to the issues involved in the operationalising of inflation 
targets and the elements of such a framework. 
 
                                                 
15 Clarida and Gertler (1996) find that the Bundesbank follows a form of the Taylor rule that is 
consistent with inflation targeting.   14
4  The Operation of an Inflation Targeting Strategy 
 
In this section the core issues pertaining to the operation of an inflation targeting 
strategy are identified and discussed.  Table 1 presents a summary of the various 
frameworks currently employed by those countries pursuing inflation targeting 
strategies. 
 
Inflation Targeting defined 
The EMI (1997a) defines an inflation targeting framework as one “which aims to 
directly steer the final target variable, the inflation rate, without the use of a separate 
intermediate target variable”.  In so doing a “quantitative reference for future inflation 
aimed precisely at anchoring inflation expectations” is provided.  This is in contrast to 
a monetary targeting strategy where a monetary aggregate is pursued as an 
intermediate target in the pursuit of the final goal.  As outlined in the previous section 
the inflation forecast can serve as an intermediate variable, while monetary aggregates 
accompany a wide range of economic and financial indicators in the assessment and 
formulation of monetary policy actions.   
 
In essence the two frameworks are not entirely dissimilar where they both pursue the 
same objective of price stability, they are both forward looking and they both, in 
practice, employ a wide variety of indicators in determining the appropriate stance of 
monetary policy (EMI 1997a).  Hence, while the difference between the two strategies 
may not have large effects on the actual implementation of policy, each leads to a 
different presentation to the public of monetary policy actions, which in turn influences 
inflationary expectations.   
 
The operational framework for an inflation targeting strategy initially involves the 
announcement by the relevant authority of an explicit inflation target or target range.  
Using a wide array of information variables, inflation forecasts are estimated to assess 
the potential range of future inflation under current policies.  If it is anticipated that 
future inflation over a given time horizon will deviate from the desired range then a 
feedback rule is employed, which directs policy actions to bring the projected inflation   15
rate back into the target range.  These feedback rules are  based on deviations between 
expected inflation (the inflation forecast) and the inflation target
16.   
 
To ensure the effective implementation of an inflation targeting strategy, given the 
increased potential for monetary discretion, there is a need for credibility enhancing 
measures, accompanied by an increased commitment to improving the transparency 
and accountability of the actions of the monetary authority.   
 
The role of inflation forecasts 
In an inflation targeting framework, the inflation forecast serves as an intermediate 
variable in the conduct of monetary policy.  It is widely accepted that there are long 
and variable lags in the transmission of monetary policy actions through to output and 
prices.  Haldane (1995a) cites these lags as the rational for an intermediate variable.  
He identifies three criteria which an intermediate indicator must satisfy: 
   
•  it must be controllable;  
•  there must be a predictable relationship between it and the final target; and  
•  it must be a leading indicator of the target variable.   
 
Haldane notes that the Bank of England’s inflation projection satisfies all three criteria.  
Svensson (1996b) takes this argument a step further and advocates the use of an 
inflation forecast as an intermediate target.  He argues that the inflation forecast is an 
ideal intermediate target based on the fact that it is easier to control and observe than 
the goal, it is incentive compatible (the monetary authority has the incentive to improve 
and develop its forecasting and modelling techniques) and it facilitates the transparency 
of monetary policy where the publication of such forecasts provides the public with a 
clear and understandable indication of the stance of monetary policy.   
 
While this role for inflation forecasts is conceptually appealing, the actual estimation of 
such forecasts is prone to significant difficulties.  The experience to-date of countries 
implementing an inflation targeting framework indicates a universal consensus as to the 
                                                 
16 Examples of such feedback rules include  the Taylor and McCallum rules referred to earlier.     16
“significant degree of uncertainty surrounding inflation projections” (Haldane 1995b).  
Reasons cited include model uncertainties; ‘true’ structural shocks and mistakes in 
projecting exogenous variables.  Moreover, inflation forecasting will also be subject to 
the Lucas critique, whereby agents’ inflation expectations will be influenced by the 
perception of the new regime, which further exacerbates difficulties already inherent in 
the process
17.   
 
In addressing these difficulties central banks targeting inflation tend to use some form 
of macro-model in formulating their projections.  Sensitivity analysis is then carried out 
whereby various scenarios concerning exogenous variables are simulated, thus arriving 
at a probabilistic distribution of possible inflation outcomes.  Off-model information is 
then brought to bear on the decision making process such as policy-makers’ 
judgements and general monetary conditions.  Arguably, the use of a broad based 
information set combined with a probabilistic approach to inflation forecasting, 
provides a superior feedback rule than a strategy focusing on a single intermediate 
variable.  The publication of inflation reports, as pioneered by the Bank of England, 
facilitates the transparency of monetary policy actions to the public and clarifies to the 
public the reasons for such actions
18.   
An Independent Central Bank 
The operational implications of an inflation targeting framework depend on the 
institutional and constitutional framework within which the regime operates.  A key 
consideration is the extent to which the monetary authority is free to pursue the goal of 
price stability independently of political influences.  Of the countries currently pursuing 
inflation targeting regimes three scenarios emerge.  The monetary authority sets the 
target, independently of the government; the target is set jointly between the 
government and the monetary authority and finally the government sets the target
19.   
                                                 
17 Specifically, the Lucas critique points out that structural parameters, such as a in Section 3, will be 
affected by policy actions.   
18 Prior to May 1997 the Bank of England lacked autonomy in the setting and implementation of 
monetary policy.  While responsibility for achieving inflation targets resided with the Bank, it was not 
completely free to choose how best to meet these targets.  As such, the need for transparency and 
credibility was heightened, and hence the production of inflation reports.  Furthermore, the 
publication of the Bank’s views and forecasts made it more costly for the Government to contravene 
the Bank’s recommendations in the pursuit of its own agenda.   
19 In many instances a switch to an inflation targeting strategy has been accompanied by institutional 
and/or constitutional changes which have increased the autonomy of the monetary authority.    17
 
Debelle and Fisher (1994) introduce the distinction between monetary authority goal 
independence and instrument independence.  Goal independence refers to the ability of 
the monetary authority to freely set its inflation targets and other objectives.  With 
instrument independence the goal may be set either jointly with, or solely by, the 
government, but the responsibility for achieving this goal lies solely with the monetary 
authority in its choice of instruments and policy actions.  In this way the operation of 
monetary policy is viewed as free from political influence, where this influence may be 
viewed as contrary to the pursuit of anti-inflationary polices, particularly in the short-
run.  Furthermore, the accountability of the central bank is maximised in attaining these 
goals.  In a similar vein, Archer (1997) argues that the issue is not so much one of rules 
versus discretion but rather rules and discretion.  The “rule” is the final goal of price 
stability (or the adherence to an inflation target) and the “discretion” lies in the 
independence of the monetary authority in the instruments and means by which it seeks 
to achieve that goal.   
 
The Bundesbank can be viewed as being both goal and instrument independent given 
its autonomy in the implementation and setting of monetary policy.  Predating the 
recent conferral of independence to the Bank of England, it could not be classified as 
either, where the British Chancellor of the Exchequer retained an influence in the 
setting of the instruments of monetary policy.  In New Zealand the goal is set by the 
Government and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) exercises discretion in 
attaining that goal, the ‘ideal’ situation envisaged by Debelle and Fisher above.  In this 
scenario the extent to which the RBNZ is accountable to the government means that it 
is government support rather than the clarity of information to the public which 
provides flexibility to the system
20.   
 
                                                                                                                                       
Furthermore, empirical evidence demonstrates that the average rate of inflation and the variability of 
inflation tend to decline where a monetary authority has been granted increased independence 
(McDonough, 1997).   
20 In the New Zealand case, however, it has been argued that the extent to which the RBNZ is 
accountable to the government directly, rather than to the broader public through increased 
transparency, can be overly restrictive and may result in damages to credibility even where goals are 
being adhered to.     18
In relation to the ESCB, the Maastricht Treaty has, in addition to establishing a clear 
mandate for price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy, provided for a 
high degree of autonomy in the ESCB’s ability to conduct monetary policy
21.  In 
preparation for monetary union considerable progress has been made by member states 
in the convergence of Central Bank legislation and independence towards that 
encapsulated in the Maastricht Treaty
22.   
 
A single objective? 
The overriding objective of an inflation targeting regime is the attainment of a pre-
announced inflation target.  Other objectives can only be pursued to the extent that 
they are consistent with the inflation target (Debelle, 1997).  An established premise of 
macroeconomics is the neutrality of monetary policy in the long-run.  Hence, the 
attainment of an inflation target need not conflict with a corresponding objective of full 
employment.  However, short-run trade-offs exist between output stabilisation and 
inflation targeting.  These short-run trade-offs arise where there is an output-
stabilisation role for monetary policy in the short-run and a long-run mandate of price 
stability.   
 
Fisher (1996) argues that emphasising the long-run goal of monetary policy as price 
stability allows the monetary authority some leeway in pursuing short-term counter 
cyclical policies.  This emphasises the fact that the short- and long-run consequences of 
monetary policy differ, which may be necessary to assuage political influences from 
pursuing expansionary rather than deflationary policies.  Fisher notes that through an 
inflation targeting strategy this distinction between the short- and long-run 
consequences of monetary policy actions is reinforced.   
 
The emphasis on price stability as the sole focus of monetary policy, such as in the case 
of New Zealand, is based on such facts as:  monetary policy affects inflation only in the 
long run; monetary policy can only deal with one short-run goal at a time; multiple 
                                                 
21 Statutory provisions include the prohibition of seeking or receiving instruction from government 
bodies, assured tenure for the members of the governing bodies of the ESCB and strict conditions on 
amending the Statute in any fundamental way.     19
objectives lower credibility, raise inflation expectations, and reduce transparency and 
accountability; the monetary authority’s autonomy may be comprised where other 
government agencies are pursuing the same objectives.  In some cases, such as Canada, 
there is a countercyclical role in the inflation targeting framework, where the monetary 
authority responds to both price increases and decreases which may place inflation 
outside of the target range.  In maintaining inflation within the target range, the central 
bank implements a stabilising role for monetary policy, where the commitment to 
adhere to the lower limit of the range (by easing monetary policy where the target is 
undershot) serves to reassure public fears that the monetary authority might pursue an 
overly restrictive strategy without regard to developments in the real economy 
(Mishkin & Posen, 1997).   
 
On an operational level the need to pursue short term countercyclical policies can be 
addressed by introducing “escape clauses” into the targeting framework.  Escape 
clauses allow the monetary authority to accommodate certain unforeseen shocks by 
modifying or suspending the inflation target.  Provided such escape clauses are made 
explicit and established a priori, there should be no adverse credibility losses.  The 
price index on which the targeting strategy is based can also be constructed in such a 
way as to reflect the ‘underlying’ inflation rate as opposed to headline inflation, for 
example, the exclusion of particularly volatile price items.  Similarly, the choice of a 
target range rather than a single point allows the monetary authority some discretion in 
coping with adverse shocks.  These issues are addressed further below.   
 
The pursuit of a separate inflation target is infeasible where an economy is operating in 
a fixed exchange rate regime.  This arises from the inability of the domestic authority 
to pursue a monetary policy independently of the country to which its exchange rate is 
pegged.  However, it should be noted that both Spain and Israel continue to adopt an 
exchange rate objective in conjunction with their inflation targets
23.  In New Zealand 
                                                                                                                                       
22 See EMI (1996) for an account of the existing independence status of member state central banks, 
and the extent to which inconsistencies remain between the Treaty and the statutes of the NCBs.   
23 Ben-Basset (1995) argues that the dual objective pursued by the Bank of Israel diminishes the 
effectiveness of monetary policy.  However, the author notes that to solely focus on an inflation target 
would be inefficient where the openness of the Israeli economy leads to a reliance on the exchange 
rate as an anchor for prices, where no stable relationships between inflation and the monetary 
aggregates can be established.  The Banco de Espana’s commitment to the stabilisation of the   20
the nominal exchange rate is seen as a major determinant of inflation outcomes.  As 
such the RBNZ estimates an exchange rate path based on forecasts for inflation where 
this path is then akin to an intermediate target.  However, the outlined path for the 
exchange rate, while similar to an intermediate target, is a conditional target path 
rather than an unconditional target level (Archer, 1997).  In a similar vein, the Bank of 
Canada employ a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) which comprises a weighted 
average of the exchange rate and the short-term interest rate.  This MCI index is often 
referred to as the short-run operating target, where its role is to provide the monetary 
authority with a guide and monitor of exchange rate and interest rate developments.  
However, it does not serve as a nominal anchor or as a rule to stabilise exchange rates.   
 
Another objective pursued by central banks, which is consistent with an inflation 
targeting framework, is that of financial stability.  Mishkin and Posen (1997) note that 
in ensuring the stability of the financial system, an inflation targeting regime is 
preferable to an exchange rate peg regime, since unlike an exchange rate peg, the 
monetary authority is not constrained from acting as lender of last resort.  However, 
while the objectives of price stability and financial stability do not ‘conflict’ under an 
inflation rate regime, a fragile banking system may decrease interest rate flexibility and 
situations may arise where individual institutions can be threatened by monetary policy 
actions.  Systemic risk however, is unlikely to pose a problem except where monetary 
policy is ‘excessively’ tight (Debelle, 1997).   
 
Accountability and Transparency 
To eliminate the inflationary bias which emerges in the absence of a ‘precommitment 
technology’, McCallum (1996) argues that external constraints must be placed on the 
monetary authority.  Inflation targets are one such ‘vehicle’ for imposing these external 
constraints.  In other words, central banks need to be accountable for their actions in 
the conduct of monetary policy.  The presence of preannounced inflation targets serve 
as a benchmark on which the performance of the monetary authorities can be 
evaluated, thereby increasing their accountability.  However, difficulties arise due to 
                                                                                                                                       
exchange rate is regarded as crucial in attaining the inflation target but also results in part from 
economic policies oriented towards convergence with the more stable European countries (see Ortega   21
the gap between the instruments of monetary policy and the final inflation target, 
coupled with the long and variable lags of monetary policy transmission, which make it 
difficult to discern the extent to which deviations from the inflation target can be 
attributed to policy errors or to shocks which could not have been anticipated.   
 
King (1997) notes that the “most obvious way in which an inflation target can reduce 
inflation bias is by creating a cost to the monetary authority of deviating from their pre-
announced judgement”.  For a ‘precommitment technology’ to be effective there must 
be some mechanism whereby the monetary authority has an incentive to avoid inflation 
bias.  A number of mechanisms have been suggested, notably those involving 
reputation, delegation and incentive contracts discussed earlier.   
 
It could be argued that the reputation effect has been successfully attained by the 
Bundesbank and the Bank of Switzerland through their sustained commitment to 
achieving low inflation over a considerable time frame
24.  The difficulty in applying the 
delegation or “conservative banker” approach is that a higher output variability in the 
short-run may ensue.  If the ‘optimal contract’ approach is adopted then this suggests 
the imposition of some form of penalty equivalent to the level of inflation bias.  In 
practise this generally involves either loss of prestige when inflation is above the target, 
or it can be reinforced by enforcing some form of monetary penalty such as fixing the 
monetary authorities budget.   
 
The New Zealand system whereby the tenure of the Governor is conditional on 
meeting the inflation target is the closest system in operation to that envisaged by 
Walsh (1995) in terms of an “incentive contract”.  However, dismissal is not 
automatic, as evidenced in 1995 and 1996 when despite failing to hit the pre-
announced target the governor was not dismissed.  This suggests that it is the signal 
which the penalty conveys, i.e. a commitment to the inflation target, which is important 
rather than the actual penalty itself.  Furthermore, it has been noted that in the event of 
                                                                                                                                        
and Bonilla; 1995).   
24 It is this reputation effect which has enabled the Bundesbank to effectively target inflation, while 
operating under the auspices of a monetary targeting regime, where the monetary target has been 
missed on several occasions.     22
dismissal, which would entail a loss of prestige, the opportunities for re-employment 
for the Governor in the private sector may well be numerous and well remunerated.   
 
In an effort to increase the accountability of the monetary authority, and to increase the 
transparency of monetary policy, many of those countries which have introduced 
inflation targeting have also introduced the publication of regular inflation reports 
where various analysis of the monetary regime are discussed.  A key aspect of such 
increased communication with the public is that monetary policy actions are explained 
to the public thereby enhancing both the transparency of monetary policy and the 
degree of accountability of the central bank
25.   
 
However, while greater policy transparency is desirable, and indeed necessary, for an 
inflation targeting strategy to be effective, it is not without costs.  Notably these 
include heightened market sensitivity to policy announcements and publications, and 
the difficulty of reversing transparency once attained.  Furthermore, with such 
heightened accountability there is a danger that a “deflationary bias” may emerge 
where given the uncertainty attached to actually attaining the inflation target, central 
bankers may act to reach the target in advance of the specified period, which may 
conflict with output stabilisation.  This may be particularly prevalent where ‘incentive 
contracts’ of the nature proposed by Walsh (1995) are introduced
26.   
 
To-date a behavioural shift in private sector expectations has been observed by 
countries employing an inflation targeting regime.  As the increased transparency of 
monetary authority actions leads to the acceptance by the public that price stability is 
indeed the focus of monetary policy actions, their inflation expectations are lowered.  
This in turn helps to increase the impact of monetary policy actions.   
 
                                                 
25 The Bank of England, the RBNZ, the Riksbank of Sweden, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of 
Spain all publish inflation reports.  Furthermore, in the UK the minutes of the new independent 
Monetary Policy Committee are published.   
26 Both the Bank of Canada and the RBNZ attained the requisite inflation target a year before it was 
actually stipulated.  In response to this the Bank of Canada announced a commitment to easing 
monetary policy when the inflation target was undershot to mitigate public fears concerning an overly 
conservative central bank.     23
Technical issues arising in the definition of targets 
There are a number of technical issues which arise in the implementation of an inflation 
targeting strategy.  Most notably these include the level that the target rate should be 
set, the choice of index and appropriate exemptions, the width of the target band, and 
the horizon of the target.   
 
•  What target value? 
The merits or otherwise of a zero inflation target have been extensively documented 
where a consensus seems to be emerging that a non-zero inflation target is preferable.
27  
Some of the key arguments which emerge in this debate include the possibility of 
downward rigidity in prices and wages where reductions in real wages can occur only 
through inflation in the general price level (Akerlof, et. al., 1996), the restrictions 
imposed by a lower band on nominal interest rates which rules out the possibility of 
negative interest rates, and the presence of biases in price indices.   
 
If a small positive inflation is the desired objective then should a point or a range target 
be chosen?  Two main arguments emerge in the context of range or point targets 
(Yates, 1995).  Firstly, the use of a target range avoids the need for excessive escape 
clauses associated with the target, where the wider the band width the fewer escape 
clauses that are required.  The second argument concerns the practical difficulty in 
steering the inflation rate with such accuracy that it arrives at a particular point, given 
the lags which arise in the implementation of monetary policy.  Finland is currently the 
only country operating an inflation targeting regime which defines a point target.  The 
motivation is that a single point serves as a better guide for the formulation of inflation 
expectations where otherwise the upper point in the range may be perceived as being 
the effective target for monetary policy, thus resulting in inflation bias
28.   
 
•  What band width?   
The choice of an appropriate band width introduces the credibility/flexibility trade-off 
debate.  The need for flexibility in the design of an inflation targeting strategy evolves 
                                                 
27 See Kenny and McGettigan (1997) for a review of the issues surrounding price stability or low 
inflation.     24
from the fact that the monetary authority has committed itself to meeting an objective 
which it can only partially control, and with a high level of uncertainty concerning 
policy outcomes.  This need for flexibility must be weighted against the credibility 
which the monetary authority seeks to overcome the difficulties of inflation bias and 
time inconsistency.  If too narrow a range is chosen then the monetary authority risks 
the possibility that any credibility gained from a narrow target range will be 
undermined if this target is breached
29.  Hence the trade-off between the credibility 
enhancing effects of a demanding target and the credibility damaging effects of failing 
to adhere to the target (Goodhart and Vinals, 1994).   
 
Empirical studies investigating the question of appropriate band widths have employed 
stochastic simulations of economic models to generate bands that are interpreted as 
probability intervals.  In general the results imply an inflation target band significantly 
larger than those in operation, where the assumption is that the band should encompass 
inflation outturns with a reasonable probability.  This suggests that existing band 
widths may be susceptible to frequent breaches arising from inflation uncertainties.   
 
•  What time horizon? 
In choosing an appropriate time horizon within which an inflation target must be met a 
number of considerations arise.  Firstly, the inflation rate at the time of introduction of 
the new strategy will need to be accounted for in setting the transition time frame.  
Thereafter, the horizon choice involves a trade off between allowing sufficient time for 
policy actions to affect the final goal, given the uncertainty regarding lag lengths, and 
the need for the horizon to be sufficiently short that it is relevant to decision makers.   
 
If the horizon chosen is too short it may result in economic instability as policy makers 
attempt to attain the target inflation rate within the given time frame.  A longer time 
frame thus reduces the necessity for central bank intervention.  A further difficulty with 
a time horizon which is too long is the danger that the accountability of the central 
                                                                                                                                       
28 While a single point target is specified by the Bank of Finland, it is not claimed that this would be 
met precisely.   
29A further point against adopting too narrow a band is the risk of inducing instability in the 
instrument of monetary policy.  This may in turn destabilise financial markets, even though the 
inflation target is being met.     25
bank is lessened where the longer the time frame the more difficult it becomes to assess 
the performance of policy makers.  This in turn impinges on the credibility gains of 
setting an inflation target in the first place.   
 
Yates (1995) notes a number of issues which are relevant in deciding on an optimal 
time horizon.  These include the time horizon over which nominal contracts are fixed, 
an estimation of the time it takes for policy actions to translate to prices, the frequency 
with which information variables are observed (an upper bound) and observed cycles in 
prices (a lower bound).   
 
•  Which price index? 
A suitable price index for the purposes of inflation targeting is one which is timely, 
widely known and understood, and rarely revised.  Retail price indices, such as the 
CPI, satisfy these criteria and are hence generally employed in inflation targeting 
frameworks.
30  These indices are generally adjusted to exclude various components 
which are viewed as either excessively volatile, or which may be prone to supply 
shocks outside the control of monetary policy.  Such an adjusted index is referred to as 
an “underlying rate” rather than a “headline rate” of inflation.  However, while such a 
measure may be appropriate in the conduct of monetary policy if it is not widely 
known and understood then inflation expectations (and hence wages and prices) may 
follow headline inflation.  In inflation targeting countries exemptions from the price 
index include food and energy prices (on the basis that they are excessively volatile), 
indirect taxes (to insulate monetary policy from changes in fiscal policy), and mortgage 
payments on housing (to avoid increases in the CPI based on deflationary monetary 
policy actions).   
 
Inflation Targeting:  An option for the ECB? 
The EMI have narrowed the choice of monetary frameworks to a choice between 
either monetary aggregate targeting or direct inflation targeting.  In assessing the 
suitability of an inflation targeting regime vis-à-vis the alternatives it is necessary to   26
envisage two scenarios;  where EMU will consist of a “core” group of countries or 
alternatively where EMU will be more broadly encompassing.  At the onset of EMU it 
is critically important that credibility is established by the newly formed ECB.  This in 
turn becomes the overriding determinant in the choice of an appropriate framework.  
In the event that a core emerges, it has been suggested that an inflation targeting 
framework would be more appropriate.  In the context of ‘monetary cohabitation’, i.e. 
the co-ordination of monetary policy between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’, Dewatripont et 
al. (1995) envisage a scenario where the outs co-ordinate their monetary policy with 
the ‘ins’ through a mutual system of inflation targets rather than fixed currencies.  This 
argument is reiterated by Persson and Tabellini (1996) who assert that with such a 
regime there will be an automatic offset of velocity shocks which will be particularly 
relevant in a monetary union.  Inflation targeting, the authors argue, is a more flexible 
framework, where large shocks can be offset without significant destabilisation effects 
on prices, output or the real exchange rate.  Hence, where the likelihood of large 
financial shocks to the system is high, monetary aggregates may prove inappropriate.  
Furthermore, the resultant increase in the accountability of the ECB which is 
associated with inflation targeting will enhance the political legitimacy of the 
organisation. 
 
Ramaswamy (1997), in addressing a situation where there is an encompassing 
monetary union, argues that inflation targeting is appropriate where there is an 
increased likelihood of a break-down in the money-inflation relationship, thereby 
negating the possibility for monetary aggregate targeting.  In operationalising a system 
of inflation targeting a set of feedback rules is required, which will revolve around 
indicators such as bond yields, the yield curve and variations in other asset prices.  
While this should prove satisfactory in the context of a core union, if a broader union 
emerges then variations in these indicators could prove significant, leading to 
difficulties in implementing a union wide set of transparent feedback rules.  Hence, 
where there is significant variability in the cyclical positions of the countries within the 
union, policy rules, and hence explicit inflation targeting, may be difficult to implement 
                                                                                                                                       
30 An alternative target which has been suggested is the GDP deflator.  However, the deflator is little 
known, is published with a lag and is generally subject to significant revisions thereby rendering it 
less useful than the retail price indices.     27
in practice.  These difficulties need to be assessed in the context of the difficulties 
which arise when implementing a framework based on targeting monetary aggregates, 
namely the difficulties in addressing large financial shocks, and the continuing extent to 
which financial innovation breaks down previously stable money-inflation relationships, 
and indeed impacts upon the ability of the monetary authority to control monetary 
aggregates themselves.   
 
Experience to-date indicates that in accordance with the concept put forward by 
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), inflation targeting should be seen as a framework rather 
than a rule.  In this regard it is important to note that in operationalising such a regime, 
a high degree of flexibility is incorporated, which allows the monetary authority to 
facilitate real output growth and fluctuations without sacrificing credibility.  As such 
the explicit announcement of an inflation target, and the demonstration of a 
commitment to that target, locks in inflationary expectations, and reduces the 
persistence of inflation bias in inflationary expectations.  Monetary aggregates are not 
abandoned, per se, but they are employed, with a wide variety of other variables, to 
inform and guide monetary policy actions, rather than functioning explicitly as a 
monetary policy rule.   
 
5  Conclusions 
Inflation targets are increasingly being adopted internationally, or in the context of 
Stage 3 of EMU being considered, as a means of implementing of monetary policy.  
Inflation targets play two key roles in the control of inflation: 
 
•  provide a transparent and coherent guide to policymaking thereby increasing 
the ability of a monetary authority to establish credibility and commitment to 
overcome the problem of inflation bias from time inconsistency 
•  communicate to the public the objectives of monetary policy so as to influence 
inflation expectations in wage and price setting arrangements. 
 
Inflation targeting can deliver long-run price stability, that is a low average rate of 
inflation, by the use of target rules where price stability is either the sole goal or where   28
there are consistent output and inflation stabilisation goals.  The Svensson rule based 
on expected inflation is a target rule that seems worthy of greater attention in the 
context of Stage Three than appears to have been the case thus far.  Given that 
monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation with long and variable lags and 
the monetary transmission mechanism is still much disputed, policymakers need to rely 
on many different indicators to determine expected inflation.  
 
The distinction between inflation targeting and monetary targeting may be overstated 
given that both strategies share many common features and both have been 
successfully applied in practice in the recent past.  The main difference at a purely 
theoretical level would be the use of intermediate targets.  However, as we have seen 
in the model used in this paper, it is in fact a distinction as to whether the intermediate 
target used is an inflation forecast or a monetary aggregate.  The decision as to which 
strategy is best may come down to a decision about  the predictability of money 
demand compared to the accuracy of inflation forecasting.  It is this comparison that 
probably offers the most fruitful area of research in determining whether inflation 
targeting or monetary targeting is better suited for the needs of the euro-area.   29
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Appendix: The Svensson Inflation Targeting Model 
 
This appendix sets out a model for inflation targeting proposed by Svensson (1996b).  
The model tries to capture the stylised facts that changes in policy have lagged impacts 
on aggregate demand and inflation.  
 
The lags in the model are described by the equations 
 
(A1)    p p a e t t t t y + + = + + 1 1 
 
where (A1) is an accelerationist Phillips curve, where p is inflation, y is the output gap, 
a is a positive constant that reflects the speed of adjustment of inflation to the output 
gap and e is a serially uncorrelated disturbance term with zero mean which can be 
interpreted as a negative supply shock, 
 
(A2)    ( ) y y i t t t t t + + = - - + 1 1 2 1 b b p h  
 
where (A2) is an IS/aggregate demand relationship, where i is the nominal interest rate, 
the bs are positive constants and h is a serially uncorrelated disturbance term with zero 
mean which can be interpreted as a demand shock. 
 
The policymaker is assumed to minimise a conventional quadratic social loss function 
which depends on deviations of p from p* and y from y* 
 
(A3a)    L Y Y t t t = - + - ( *) ( *) p p l
2 2  
  or in terms of the output gap 
(A3b)    L y t t t = - + ( *) ( ) p p l
2 2  
 
where p* is the long run inflation target, Y* is potential output.  The l ‡ 0 term is the 
weight on output stabilisation around the natural output level relative to inflation 
stabilisation around the long run inflation target.  The l = 0 implies a single goal of 
inflation stabilisation while l > 0 attaches importance to output stabilisation in a joint 
objective for monetary policy.  The intertemporal loss function is 
 









where d is the discount rate such that 0 < d < 1. 
 
To solve the model we take a one period control problem initially where the period 
loss function is  
 
(A5)    ( ) ( ) L y y t t t t p p p l ,
* = - +
2 2    33
 
and the one period value function that we wish to optimise is  
 
(A6)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) V y E V t
y
t t t t
t




subject to the constraints in (A1) and (A2) such that substituting for pt+1 
 




The first order condition is 
 
(A7)   


































Using an indirect loss function that is quadratic 
 
(A8)    ( ) ( ) V k k t t p p p = + - 0
2 *  
 
where the k0 and k need to be determined.  Using this we can substitute for Vp(pt+1) in 
(A7) by getting the first order condition of  
 
(A9)    ( ) V k k k k t t t p p p p p + + + = + - + 1 0 1
2
1
2 2 * *  
 
(A10)    ( ) [ ] V
v
k k k t
t
t
t t p p
¶ p
¶p
p p p p ( ) * * +
+
+
+ + = = - = - 1
1
1
1 1 2 2 2  
 
substitute this into the first order condition in (A7) above (noting Etpt+1 = pt+1|t) to get 
 
(A11)    ( ) ( ) 2 2 2 0 1 1 l da p l da p p p y E V y k t t t t t lt + = + - = + +
*  
 
Rearranging to (A11) we get 
(A12)    p p
l
da
t lt t k
y + - = - 1
*  
 
We can then rearrange (A12) to get a decision rule for yt 
 
(A13)    ( ) [ ] y
k k






p a p 1
* *  
 
Rearranging this we get   34
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Then using the above for yt we get 
 
(A14)    ( ) p p a p a
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l da
p p t lt t t t t y
k
k





ł ￿ 1 2
*  
 
rearranging the terms and adding (p* - p*) we get 
 


































































(A15)    ( ) p p
l
l da




- 1 2 |
* *  
 
In order to identify the parameter k we need to make use of the envelope theorem
*. 
Using (A6) we have  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
V y E V
V y E V
t t t t t
t t t t t t
p p p l d p
p p p p p l d p
= - + +











Get the first order condition where 
 





t t t p p p
¶ p
¶p
p p d p = = - + = + 2 2 0 1
*  
 
Using E V k t t t t p p p p ( ) ( *) | + + = - 1 1 2 and  ( ) ( ) V k t t p p p p + + = - 1 1 2
*  we get 
 
(A17)    ( ) ( ) V k t t t lt p p p p d p p ( )
* * = - + - + 2 2 1  
 
Then using (A15) 
                                                 
*  The Envelope Theorem states that the total derivative of the value function with respect to a 
parameter equals the partial derivative when the derivative is evaluated at the optimal level.   35
(A18)    ( ) ( ) ( ) V k
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t t t p p p p d p
l
l da





ł ￿ 2 2 2
* * * *  
 
(A19)      ( ) ( ) V
k
k
t t p p
dl
l da





ł ￿ - 2 1 2
*  
 
Then from (A8) we can identify k from the above as the coefficient on (pt - p*) 
 










There is a unique positive solution that fulfills k ‡ 1which can be solved analytically.  
Multiply both sides of (A20) by l + da
2k we get 
 
(A21)    ( ) k k k k l da l da dl + = + + 2 2  
 
Rearranging 
    k k k k l da l da dl + - - - = 2 2 2 0 
and dividing by da
2 
    k k k k 2








we get  
(A22)    ( )
k k 2 1
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we have for the term inside the square root as 
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putting this term back in for k we get 
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l i e . .
 
 
Taking this one period control problem and extending it to two periods the value 
function to optimise in this case is expressed as  
 
(A24)    ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] V y EV t lt y t lt t lt t t lt
t lt











subject to  
 
(A25)    ( ) p p a p a e ah t lt t t t lt t lt t t y y + + + + + + + + = + = + + + 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
 
where we have used (A1) and where using (A2) 
 
(A26)    y y y i t lt t t t t t + + + = + = - - 1 1 1 1 2 h b b p ( )  
 
Rearranging (A26) we get 











The first order condition in this case can, analogously to (A12), be expressed as    37
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We make use of the fact that 
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We can use this to solve for (A27) as follows substituting yt+1|t using (A28) 
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and substituting for pt+2|t from above  
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Expanding this out and rearranging 
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(A29)    ( ) i h gy t t t t - = - + p p p
*  
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By (A1) and using p p a t t t t y + + + + = + 2 1 1 1 and p p a t t t t t t y + + + = + 2 1 1|   we get 
 
(A30)      ( ) yt lt t lt t lt + + + = - 1 2 1
1
a
p p  
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Bring the bracketed term to the other side we get 
 
(A33)    ( ) p p p t lt t lt c c + + = + - 2 1 1
*  
 











The coefficient C will be decreasing in l and increasing in a.  To show that C is 
increasing in l we use (A23) for k and divide by l to get z 
  



























dividing the square root term in (A23) by  l l
2 =  
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Get the first order condition of (A35) 
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 > 0 if w > 0 implying that l > 0 
 
To show that C is decreasing in a let 
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Multiplying (A23) by   and the square root term by   
2 a a a = ,  
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Get the first order condition 
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The C decreases from 1 to 0 as l goes from 0 to ¥.  
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